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Abstract Fair exchange turns out to be an increasingly important topic
due to the rapid growth of electronic commerce An exchange is deemed
to be fair if at the end of exchange either each party receives the expected
item or neither party receives any useful information about the other	s
item Several protocols for fair exchange have been proposed in recent
years In this paper we 
rst examine a newly published fair exchange
protocol and point out its aws and weaknesses We then put forward a
more ecient and secure protocol and give an informal analysis
Keywords fair exchange certied mail secure electronic commerce
 Introduction
Due to the rapid growth of electronic commerce nowadays a related security
issue on the fair exchange of electronic data between two parties over computer
networks is of more and more importance We can nd various exchange instances
in dierent types of commercial activity 
 In contract signing two parties exchange their non	repudiable commitment
to the contract text
 In purchasing a payment is exchanged for a valuable item
 In certied mail a message is exchanged for an acknowledgement of receipt
An exchange is fair if at the end of exchange either each party receives the
expected item or neither party receives any useful information about the other
s
item
In electronic commerce scenarios exchanges have to be carried over insecure
networks and transacting parties may not trust each other There could be sub	
sequent disputes about what was exchanged during a transaction even if the
exchange itself was completed fairly In this case evidence should be accumu	
lated during the exchange to enable the settlement of any future disputes
Solutions to the fair exchange problem reported in the literature fall into two
categories
 Gradual exchange protocols     where two parties gradually dis	
close the expected items by many steps
 Third party protocols       which make use of an on	line or
o	line trusted third party
The gradual exchange solutions may have theoretical value but seem to be too
cumbersome for actual implementation because of the high communication over	
head Hence recent research mainly focuses on the third party solutions
As the use of trusted third party TTP in fair exchange may cause the
bottleneck problem it is desirable to minimize the TTP
s involvement when
designing ecient fair exchange protocols Such an attempt has been made in
 where the TTP acts as a notary rather than a delivery authority However
the TTP still needs to be involved in each protocol run though this might be
necessary in some applications 
The TTP
s involvement is further reduced in    where transacting
parties are willing to resolve communications problems between themselves and
turn to the TTP only as a last recourse However only the risk	taking party
originator is allowed to invoke the TTP the responder may not know the nal
state of exchange in time If a short time limit is imposed on a protocol run
the originator may not be quick enough to invoke the TTP for recovery thus the
fairness will be destroyed
Asokan Shoup and Waidner proposed a generic fair exchange protocol in
 which uses the TTP only in the case of exceptions and tolerates temporary
failures in the communication channels to the TTP In addition it allows either
party to unilaterally bring a protocol run to completion without losing fairness
In this paper we examine an instantiation of their generic fair exchange pro	
tocol for certied mail and put forward proposals for improvement The following
general notation is used throughout the paper
 XY  concatenation of two messages X and Y 
 HX a one	way hash function applied to message X 
 eKX and dKX  encryption and decryption of message X with key K
 sS
A
X principal A
s digital signature on message X with the private key
S
A
 The algorithm is assumed to be a signature with appendix
 and the
message is not recoverable from the signature
 A B  X  principal A dispatches message X addressed to principal B
 ASW Protocol
A protocol for certied mail was proposed in  see Figure  in the original
paper In this section we give a brief description of the protocol which is
referred to as ASW protocol herein
In certied mail a sender O wants to send a mail message M to a receiver
R The sender O requires that the receiver R not be able to deny receiving the
message M  To achieve this O needs a non	repudiation of receipt token from
R in exchange for the message M  Thus certied mail is a fair exchange of the
message and its non	repudiation of receipt token
ASW protocol has three sub	protocols exchange abort and resolve In the
normal case only the exchange sub	protocol is executed The other two sub	
protocols are used only if O or R presumes that something has gone wrong and
decides to forcibly complete a protocol run This is an indeterminate choice made
locally by O or R without losing fairness A trusted third party TTP will be
invoked in the abort and resolve sub	protocols It is assumed that communication
channels between any two parties are condential It is further assumed that the
communication channels between the TTP and each transacting party O and
R are resilient ie messages inserted into a resilient channel will eventually be
delivered
The notation below is used in the description of ASW protocol
 P
TTP
 the TTP
s public encryption key
 V
O
and V
R
 verication keys of O and R respectively
 key
O
and key
R
 random numbers generated by O and R respectively
 C  eP
TTP
Mkey
O
 V
O
 V
R
 encrypted mail message
 HM receipt text of a mail message M 
The exchange sub	protocol is as follows
 O  R  me  V
O
 V
R
TTP CHM sS
O
V
O
 V
R
TTP CHM
IF R gives up THEN quit ELSE
 R O  me  Hkey
R
 sS
R
me Hkey
R

IF O gives up THEN abort ELSE
 O  R  me Mkey
O
IF R gives up THEN resolve R ELSE
 R O  me  key
R
IF O gives up THEN resolve O
The abort sub	protocol is as follows
 O  TTP  ma  abortedme sS
O
abortedme
IF R has resolved THEN resolve O ELSE
 TTP O  abort token  ma sS
TTP
ma
The resolve R sub	protocol is as follows
 R TTP  mrr  V
R
meme key
R
IF aborted THEN
 TTP  R  mrr  abort token
ELSE
 TTP  R  mrr Mkey
O
The resolve O sub	protocol is as follows
 O  TTP  mro  V
O
memeM key
O
IF aborted THEN
 TTP O  mro  abort token
ELSE
 TTP O  adavit token  adavitmro sS
TTP
adavitmro
In the exchange sub	protocol if R decides to give up before sending me
it can simply terminate the protocol run without losing fairness If O decides
to give up after sending me usually because O does not receive me within
a reasonable time it invokes the TTP by running the abort sub	protocol If R
decides to give up after sending me typically because R does not receive me
in time it invokes the TTP by running the resolve R sub	protocol If O decides
to give up after sending me typically because O does not receive me in time
it invokes the TTP by running the resolve O sub	protocol
The abort sub	protocol is used by O to abort the protocol so that the TTP
will not resolve the protocol at a later time The resolve O and resolve R sub	
protocols are used by O and R respectively to force a successful termination
Clearly only one of the abort or resolve sub	protocols can succeed for a given
instance of exchange On the TTP
s system each of the abort and resolve sub	
protocol is guaranteed to be atomic
In ASW protocol either a tuple meme key
R
 or an adavit token serves
as a valid receipt for a mail message
 Some Remarks
The requirements for fair exchange were formulated in 
 Eectiveness If two parties behave correctly they will receive the expected
items without any involvement of the TTP
 Fairness After completion of a protocol run either each party receives the
expected item or neither party receives any useful information about the
other
s item
 Timeliness At any time during a protocol run each party can unilaterally
choose to terminate the protocol without losing fairness
 Nonrepudiation If an item has been sent from party O to party R O cannot
deny origin of the item and R cannot deny receipt of the item
 Veriability of Third Party If the third party misbehaves resulting in the
loss of fairness for a party the victim can prove the fact in a dispute
ASW protocol was designed to meet the above requirements Nevertheless
some problems might exist
Remark  The abort subprotocol is awed
The abort sub	protocol is initiated by O usually because O does not receive
me in time If R has already resolved the protocol O is asked to initiate the
resolve O sub	protocol

 However O is unable to initiate the resolve O sub	
protocol without me Thus O has neither an abort token nor an adavit token
at the end of a protocol run while R has received the mail message
In addition O may misbehave by initiating the abort sub	protocol after it
has initiated the resolve O sub	protocol and obtained an adavit token If the
TTP sends an abort token to O in this case the TTP will be in a dilemma when
R initiates the resolve R sub	protocol later
These problems also exist in their generic protocol for fair exchange A xed
abort sub	protocol is as follows
 O  TTP  ma  abortedme sS
O
abortedme
IF O has resolved THEN
 TTP O  ma  adavit token
ELSE IF R has resolved THEN
 TTP O  ma  me key
R
ELSE
 TTP O  abort token  ma sS
TTP
ma
Remark  There is some redundancy in the resolve O subprotocol
O need not send M and key
O
to the TTP in the resolve O sub	protocol
With me and me it is sucient for the TTP to issue the adavit token If R
resolves the protocol later the TTP can obtain M by decrypting C contained
in me
key
O
was used in ASW protocol as a part of non	repudiation of origin token
In fact me is already a complete non	repudiation of origin token Hence key
O
can be omitted from all sub	protocols
Remark  The protocol performance may degrade when transmitting large mail
messages
The exchange sub	protocol may become less ecient when the mail message
is large since a mail message needs to be transmitted twice that is cipher text
C in me and plain text M in me The communication overheads will increase
even more when the abort or resolve sub	protocols are invoked

Actually R can initiate the resolve R subprotocol before sending me to O
It is also a burden to the TTP to deal with the whole mail messages when
the abort or resolve sub	protocols are invoked The TTP needs a large space to
store those mail messages and tokens safely until both parties have retrieved the
expected items
Remark  The privacy of mail messages may not be well protected
As we just mentioned if the abort or resolve sub	protocols are invoked the
content of a mail message has to be disclosed to the TTP Such a situation
may be undesirable to the parties who want to exchange mail messages secretly
between themselves
Although it is possible to encrypt the mail message either with a key shared
between two parties or with the receiver
s public encryption key before exchange
this will make the dispute resolution more complicated If there is no evidence
to prove what key is used and the times of encryption performed the content of
a mail message will be in dispute
Remark  The encrypted data in the nonrepudiation of receipt token may not
be publicly veriable which makes the dispute resolution inecient
Suppose O sends the following me to R where M

M 
me  V
O
 V
R
TTP CHM

 sS
O
V
O
 V
R
TTP CHM


If R does not receiveme in time after sendingme R may execute the resolve R
sub	protocol by sending mrr  V
R
meme key
R
 to the TTP If O has not
aborted the protocol the TTP will decrypt the mail message in me and send
mrr  Mkey
O
 to R If the TTP discloses key
R
to O O will have a complete
receipt meme key
R
 which can make an arbitrator to believe that R received
M

instead of M by only checking the receipt text HM

 However the TTP
s
misbehavior cannot be veried since key
R
could be sent to O by R itself after
receiving M

from O
This problem could be tackled if the arbitrator further checks whether the
decrypted mail message M and the receipt text HM

 in me match If true
me is regarded as a valid part of receipt However this may require the TTP
s
involvement because the mail message is encrypted with the TTP
s public key


That means the TTP may need to be online for dispute resolution If the TTP is
temporary unavailable arbitration has to be postponed If the TTP
s private key
has lost when a dispute arises the arbitrator cannot make a proper conclusion

If the ElGamal publickey cryptosystem  is used the encrypted message cannot
be veri
ed even with the plain message and the public key unless the random seed
for ElGamal encryption is also provided But the random seed is usually not saved
after encryption
The above problems may not be fatal to ASW protocol but could aect its
eciency and security
 A Variant Protocol
Here we present a more ecient and secure protocol for certied mail mainly
based on the ideas from   We split the denition of a mail messageM into
two parts a commitment C and a key K In the normal case the originator O
sends CK plus evidence of origin to the recipient R in exchange for evidence
of receipt without any involvement of the TTP If there is something wrong in
the middle of exchange either O or R can unilaterally bring a protocol run to
completion with the help from the TTP The TTP only needs to notarise andor
deliver the message key K by request which is usually much shorter than the
whole mail message M 
The notation below is used in the description of our protocol
 M  mail message being sent from O to R
 K message key dened by O
 C  eKM commitment cipher text for message M 
 L  HMK a unique label linking C and K
 f
i
  i   ags indicating the intended purpose of a signed message
 EOO C  sS
O
f

 R L C evidence of origin of C
 EOR C  sS
R
f

 O LEOO C evidence of receipt of C
 EOO K  sS
O
f

 R LK evidence of origin of K
 EOR K  sS
R
f

 O LEOO K evidence of receipt of K
 sub K  sS
O
f

 R LKTTPEOO C evidence of submission of K to the
TTP
 con K  sS
TTP
f

 OR LK evidence of conrmation of K issued by the
TTP
 abort  sS
TTP
f

 OR L evidence of abortion
 P
TTP
 the TTP
s public encryption key
Like ASW protocol our protocol has three sub	protocols exchange abort and
resolve We also assume that the communication channels between the TTP and
each transacting party O and R are resilient In addition we assume that the
communication channel between O and R is condential if the two parties want
to exchange mail messages secretly The exchange sub	protocol is as follows
 O  R  f

 f

 R L CTTP eP
TTP
KEOO C sub K
IF R gives up THEN quit ELSE
 R O  f

 O LEOR C
IF O gives up THEN abort ELSE
 O  R  f

 R LKEOO K
IF R gives up THEN resolve ELSE
 R O  f

 O LEOR K
IF O gives up THEN resolve
The abort sub	protocol is as follows
 O  TTP  f

 R L sS
O
f

 R L
IF resolved THEN
 TTP O  f

 f

 OR LK con KEOR C
ELSE
 TTP O  f

 OR L abort
The resolve sub	protocol is as follows where the initiator U is either O or R
 U  TTP  f

 f

 OR LTTP eP
TTP
K sub KEOO CEOR C
IF aborted THEN
 TTP U  f

 OR L abort
ELSE
 TTP U  f

 f

 OR LK con KEOR C
In our protocol evidence EOR C EOR K or EOR C con K can be used
to prove that R received the messageM  evidence EOO C EOO K or EOO C
con K can be used to prove that O sent the message M 
If the exchange sub	protocol is executed successfully R will receive C and K
and thus M  dKC together with non	repudiation of origin tokens EOO C
EOO K Meanwhile O will receive non	repudiation of receipt tokens EOR C
EOR K
R can simply quit the transaction without losing fairness before sending
EOR C to O Otherwise R has to run the resolve sub	protocol to force a suc	
cessful termination Similarly O can run the abort sub	protocol to quit the trans	
action without losing fairness before sending EOO K to R Otherwise O has to
run the resolve sub	protocol to force a successful termination
The resolve sub	protocol can be initiated either by O or by R When the
TTP receives such a request the TTP will rst check the status of a transaction
identied by ORL uniquely If the transaction has been aborted by O the
TTP will return the abort token If the transaction has already been resolved
the TTP will deliver the tuple f

 f

 OR LK con KEOR C to the current
initiator of the resolve sub	protocol Otherwise the TTP will
 decrypt eP
TTP
K and verify with sub K that K is submitted by O
 check that EOR C is consistent with sub K in terms of L and EOO C
 generate evidence con K
 deliver the tuple f

 f

 OR LK con KEOR C to the current initiator
 set the status of the transaction resolved
The third component in the tuple indicates the key supplier which is authenti	
cated by sub K and notarised in con K Hence intruders cannot mount a denial	
of	service attack by sending bogus keys to the TTP for conrmation Evidence
con K can be used to prove that
 a transaction identied by ORL has been resolved successfully
 the message key K originated from O and
 the message key K is available from the TTP by request
In comparison with ASW protocol our protocol has the following merits
 The TTP
s overhead will not increase when transmitting large mail messages
 The content of a mail message need not be disclosed to any outsiders includ	
ing the TTP
 The evidence is publicly veriable without any restrictions on the types of
signature and encryption algorithms
Therefore our protocol is more ecient and secure than ASW protocol both at
the stage of exchange and at the stage of dispute resolution
 Security Analysis
We analyse our protocol with respect to the requirements listed in Section 
Claim  If the communication channel between O and R is resilient the protocol
satises the eectiveness requirement
Proof If both O and R are honest they will send their messages according to
the protocol description If the communication channel between them is resilient
a message sent by either party will eventually be received by the other party
Thus the exchange sub	protocol can be executed successfully without invoking
the TTP R will receive C and K and thus M  dKC together with non	
repudiation of origin tokens EOO C EOO K Meanwhile O will receive non	
repudiation of receipt tokens EOR C EOR K
Claim  If the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting
party O and R	 are resilient the protocol satises the fairness requirement
Proof We rst consider the possible unfair situations that O may face
 O did not receive any message fromR after sending message  in the exchange
sub	protocol In this case O can initiate the abort sub	protocol which is
guaranteed to be completed within a nite period under the assumption If
R has not resolved the protocol the TTP will not resolve the protocol at a
later time thus R cannot obtain K which means R cannot receive M  If R
has already resolved the protocol O will obtain EOR C and con K from the
TTP which can be used to prove that R received M 
 O did not receive EOR K after sending message  in the exchange sub	
protocol In this case O can initiate the resolve sub	protocol to obtain con K
from the TTP which can be used in place of EOR K to prove that R received
or is able to receive K provided the assumption holds
The only possible unfair situation that R may face is that R did not receive
K and EOO K after sending message  in the exchange sub	protocol In this
case R can initiate the resolve sub	protocol to obtain K and con K under the
same assumption
Thus the protocol satises the fairness requirement from both points of view
of O and R
Claim  If the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting
party O and R	 are resilient the protocol satises the timeliness requirement
Proof We rst look at the possible ways that O can conclude a protocol run
 terminating normally after sending message  in the exchange sub	protocol
 invoking the abort sub	protocol at any time before sending message  in the
exchange sub	protocol
 invoking the resolve sub	protocol at any time after receiving message  in
the exchange sub	protocol
As we assume that the communication channel between the TTP and O is re	
silient the abort and resolve sub	protocols initiated by O are guaranteed to be
completed within a nite period Thus at any time there is always a way for O
to conclude the protocol run
On the other hand the possible ways that R can conclude a protocol run are
 terminating normally after receiving message  in the exchange sub	protocol
 simply quitting at any time before sending message  in the exchange sub	
protocol
 invoking the resolve sub	protocol at any time after receiving message  in
the exchange sub	protocol
Again each of these will result in the timely conclusion of the protocol run for
R
Claim  If the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting
party O and R	 are resilient the protocol meets the nonrepudiation require
ment
Proof By the protocol description R will hold the following non	repudiation
of origin tokens
 EOO C EOO K if the protocol terminates normally
 EOO C con K otherwise
Meanwhile O will hold the following non	repudiation of receipt tokens
 EOR C EOR K if the protocol terminates normally
 EOR C con K otherwise
EOO C proves that O sent C with label L to R while EOO K proves that
O sent K with label L to R Thus EOO C EOO K proves that M  dKC
is from O The link between C and K is computationally unique which should
satisfy L  HdKCK
In the same way EOR C proves that R received C with label L from O while
EOR K proves that R received K with label L from O Thus EOR C EOR K
proves that R received M  dKC
Alternatively con K proves that the TTP notarised K with label L at O
s
request and that R received or is able to receive K with label L from the TTP
under the assumption of a resilient channel with the TTP Thus con K can be
used with EOO C and EOR C to prove the origin and receipt of M 
Claim  If the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting
party O and R	 are resilient and that the TTP can be forced to eventually send
a valid response to any request sent to it the TTP is veriable
Proof Under the assumptions the TTP
s possible misbehavior could be
 R receives the abort token while O receives con K
 R receives K and con K while O receives the abort token
In the rst case if O uses EOR C and con K to prove that R received M  R
can use the abort token to prove the TTP
s misbehavior
In the second case if R uses EOO C and con K to prove that O sentM to R
O can use the abort token to prove the TTP
s misbehavior It should be noted
that if R uses EOO C and EOO K to prove that O sent M to R O cannot use
the abort token to prove the TTP
s misbehavior since the TTP did not issue
conicting evidence
 Conclusion
We investigated ASW protocol and found out the following weaknesses besides
some minor aws being xed
 The performance may degrade when transmitting large mail messages
 The privacy of mail messages may not be well protected
 The TTP may need to be online for dispute resolution
We proposed a variant protocol which overcomes the above weaknesses The se	
curity analysis shows that our protocol meets the requirements for fair exchange
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